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The cable industry consists of both upstream and down-stream firms: the Cable Television Programming Service Providers (CTPSPs) and the Multichannel Service 
Operators (MSOs). The CTPSPs create and provide basic 
cable programming to MSOs in exchange for monthly per-sub-
scriber fees; they also receive funding from advertisers ( JRANK 
Encyclopedia). MSOs purchase franchise rights to operate in 
specific regions, where they act as monopoly providers of cable,* 
providing subscribers with their choice of programming bundle 
for a monthly fee. In this paper, I look at the effects upstream 
bundling may have on subscribers. Gregory Crawford shows that 
downstream bundling of highly sought- after programming low-
ers subscriber surplus but raises profits for the cable providers 
(Crawford 2006). However, a model allowing for differentiated 
consumer preferences reveals that the price-discriminatory ef-
fects of bundling† may in fact raise consumer surplus. Indeed, 
while Michael Whinston emphasizes that bundling independent 
goods is an effective and profitable means for deterring entry 
(Whinston 1990), my model points to a somewhat counterintuitive 
outcome: product bundling can, at times, facilitate market entry by com-
petitors and improve the welfare of consumers. My approach supports 
* In a 2005 interview for the Hauser Oral and Video History Collection, former TCI 
employee Darlene Payne  recounts that franchise renewals were not complicated by 
competition because over-building was costly and ineffective. While m a n y  debate 
whether cable systems should be treated as natural monopolies (see, for example, Bolick 
1984), franchise agreements have effectively provided exclusive regional monopolies (Cui 
et al. 2005).
† "e use of bundling to allow for price discrimination between consumers has been widely 
discussed (Stigler 1968; Adams and Yellen 1976; McAfee et al. 1989). More recently, 
Gregory Crawford concluded that bundling may provide a way for monopolists to reduce 
heterogeneity in consumer preferences for various goods and to capture higher profits than they 
could without bundling (Crawford 2005).
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previous research conducted by Whinston that models 
heterogeneous preferences for one monopoly good that is tied 
to another monopoly good in a market that faces entry. My 
contribution is an evaluation of the effect of bundling on entry 
deterrence in light of heterogeneous preferences for both goods. 
My model also applies the theoretical aspects of bundling to 
a specific case in the cable industry; the Time Warner-Turner 
merger finalized in September of 1996 (FTC v. Time Warner 
et al., Complaint, 1997) serves as both an illustration and 
inspiration for my model.
One recurring debate in the literature on bundling 
goods focuses on the intersection of leverage theory and ty-
ing strategies. "e Chicago School did not view tying as a vi-
able strategy for a firm producing both a monopolized and a 
competitively supplied good. Its main argument was that the 
monopoly would have no apparent motivation for leveraging its 
market power over a bundled good when it could extract the 
same monopoly profit from selling the unbundled components 
(see Posner 1976 or Bork 1978). Whinston later changes this 
argument by saying that a similar firm may find tying to be a 
profitable strategy, as precommitments to tying could allow 
the firm to monopolize the market in which it currently pro-
duces the competitively supplied good (Whinston 1990). In ad-
dition to showing that bundling can be used to profitably deter 
entry, Whinston finds that heterogeneous consumer preferences 
eliminate the need for precommitment, as bundling may also act 
as a profitable strategy post-entry. "us, in many cases, bun-
dling may lead the other entrants to exit the market through 
strategic foreclosure. In his argument that a precommitment 
to tying is not necessary, Barry Nalebuff concludes that tying 
can actually mitigate profit losses in the case of entry (2004); 
this only holds under certain conditions in my model. For the 
purposes of my model, the precommitment discussion is not 
particularly relevant, as I will be assessing the value of  a par-
ticular court agreement. I assume that Time Warner’s bun-
dling decision always holds. If there were a chance that Time 
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Warner could change its bundling decision post-entry, then the 
ban on bundling would be trivial. Assuming that some form of 
precommitment can be made, results that show that bundling 
does not always deter entry become interesting.
!e model used in this paper is a variation on the Whin-
ston model for the pure bundling* of two independent goods. In 
section one, I give a brief historical introduction to the merger. 
In section two, I present the model, the results and limita-
tions of which I describe in s ec t ion  th ree . In section four, I 
conclude.
I. CASE BACKGROUND
In 1995, the three largest multichannel system opera-
tors, Telecommunications, Inc. (TCI), Time Warner (TW), and 
Comcast, served approximately 20, 16, and 6 percent of cable 
subscribers, respectively.† TCI and TW acted as both MSOs 
and CTPSPs, producing their own programming and providing it 
to other MSOs (FTC v. Time Warner et al.; Complaint, 1997). 
Despite high levels of concentration in the cable industry, limi-
tations on anticompetitive behavior, especially among vertically 
integrated firms, were enforced in the early 1990s. In particular, 
the 1992 Cable Act prevented MSOs from entering into exclu-
sive contracts with CTPSPs, in which they had a financial interest, 
and forbade CTPSP price discrimination against the competi-
tors of its own downstream MSO, among other restrictions. 
By 1995, rapidly rising cable rates led to a series of at-
tempts to encourage competition in the industry through de-
regulation; however, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 failed 
to foster effective competition for the cable firms.‡ Instead, the 
* Pure bundling means that only the bundle is provided, whereas mixed bundling o f f e r s 
both the bundle and its components independently. When I refer to bundling in this 
paper, I am referring to “pure bundling” only; I make no distinction between bundling 
and tying.
† Data compiled from the Encyclopedia for Business (“Cable and other pay television 
services”) and the NCTA website ("Industry Data").
‡ Neither telephone nor satellite companies were able to provide effective competition for 
cable until much later; the mid-1990s saw cable prices continue to rise, largely uninhibited 
201Journal of Politics & Society
newly deregulated cable industry saw even more acquisitions 
and higher levels of concentration (Encyclopedia for Business) 
as prices continued to rise (Consumer Federation of America 
2001). It was in this atmosphere that Time Warner announced 
its decision to merge with Turner Broadcasting.
!e Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reacted immedi-
ately to the merger, as it posed anticompetitive threats in both 
horizontal and vertical integration aspects; not only would the 
TW CTPSP’s incentives be aligned with those of the Turner 
CTPSP, but the Turner CTPSP would also be vertically joined 
to the TW MSO. !ese relationships were further complicated 
by TCI’s partial ownership (24 percent) of Turner prior to the 
merger, which translated to an approximately 9 percent non-
voting share in new Time Warner.* Additionally, TCI could con-
tinue to purchase shares until a poison pill† would finally dilute 
its ownership after it passed 18 percent (still a silent, or non-
voting, share). Nonetheless, the FTC was afraid that the close 
alignment of the three firms, strengthened by agreements that 
forced TCI to carry certain Turner programming on its MSOs, 
would leave TCI with little incentive to compete with Turner 
broadcasting. !is fear, when compounded with the potential 
for high prices through horizontal integration and the potential 
for foreclosures induced by vertical integration, led to extensive 
FTC scrutiny of the merger.‡ Ultimately, a consent agreement 
was formed that temporarily ended the TCI-Turner carriage 
agreements, limited TCI’s partial ownership share to 9.2 percent 
of Time Warner’s fully diluted equity, and placed further stipu-
lations on Time Warner’s business decisions, one of which will 
by rate regulation after the Telecommunications Act (Consumer Relations of America 2001).
* !e facts I cite in my discussion of the historical background of the merger come 
from a case study by the consultants to TCI’s attorneys in the FTC proceedings (Besen, 
Murdoch, O’Brien, Salop, and Woodbury 1999).
† A poison pill is a strategy used by a company to make itself less attractive to an acquirer 
considering a hostile takeover.
‡ Chipty finds that vertically integrated MSOs often refuse to carry the networks of 
CTPSPs that compete with their own CTPSPs, e . g . ,  Comcast cable in Philadelphia 
does not offer the commonly offered network, Fox Sports, but instead offers its own sports 
program, Comcast SportsNet (Chipty 2001).
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be discussed in detail in this paper (FTC v. Time Warner et 
al., Consent Agreement, 1997).
!is paper focuses on part five of the consent agreement, 
which forbade Time Warner from bundling TW premium cable 
broadcasts with Turner-affiliated basic programming; specifi-
cally, the consent agreement included Time Warner’s Home Box 
Office (HBO) and Turner’s Cable News Network (CNN) in 
the bundling restriction (FTC v. Time Warner et al., Consent 
Agreement, 1997). At the time of the merger, HBO received the 
largest amount of subscription revenues of all U.S. programming 
and was considered by MSOs to be a “marquee” service neces-
sary for acquiring a significant subscriber base (FTC v. Time 
Warner et al., Complaint, 1997). Although CNN operated as a 
monopoly in the twenty-four hour news market prior to the 
Time Warner-Turner merger, the announcement of the merger 
coincided with a declaration from FOX, a competing CTPSP, 
that it intended to enter the market by creating the FOX 
News Channel (Besen et al. 1999). One may interpret the consent 
agreement’s restriction of HBO-CNN bundling as an attempt 
by the FTC to protect the entry of FOX News. However, my 
model will explore the possibility that HBO-CNN bundling 
may, in some cases, have made FOX entry easier than it was 
under the non-bundling policy. My model also provides some 
insight into the effect of bundling on consumer surplus.
II.  THE MODEL
!e following model seeks to reconstruct the relationship be-
tween CPTSPs and cable subscribers. Because each MSO oper-
ates as a regional monopoly, pays a monthly per-subscriber fee 
to the CPTSPs, and receives a monthly fee from subscribers, 
the relationship between firms can be greatly simplified with a 
few assumptions. First, I look at only those MSOs with no fi-
nancial i n v e s t m e n t  i n  either Time Warner or FOX. While 
these MSOs must pay fixed franchise fees to operate in their 
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regions,* they are able to pass these fees along to all subscribers 
(Pioneer Communications 2008). I assume that cable subscribers 
have already paid these fixed fees and they do not, therefore, 
enter into the subscribers’ preferences for additional cable pro-
gramming. To simplify the model further, I do not address any 
other fixed costs that may be encountered by the MSOs. I 
assume that the MSOs have already paid upfront fees to both 
Time Warner and FOX, permitting them to purchase any addi-
tional programming from either company at the monthly per-
subscriber costs.
To assess the effect of upstream bundling on consumer 
surplus, I assume that the MSOs add a constant markup 
to the monthly per-subscriber fees that they are charged by 
the CPTSPs. The MSOs then charge their subscribers this 
monthly amount (the sum of the markup and the fee which the 
MSOs must pay the CTPSPs). To simplify the model, I set the 
markup equal to zero, so that the subscribers’ monthly payments 
are equal to the MSO monthly payments. In other words, the 
consumers must pay a monthly fee to the MSOs, who then pass 
this payment directly along to the CPTSP. "us, as consumer 
preferences are reflected directly in the MSO’s purchase deci-
sions, the MSO’s intermediary role is taken out of the model.
For simplicity, I also assume that co n s u m e rs  cannot 
purchase both FOX News and CNN. Of course, if consumers’ 
willingness to pay for both channels is greater than the price 
charged by the MSO, there would be no reason to prevent 
them from purchasing both channels. However, this simplifica-
tion suggests a more conservative approach to the model. If 
consumers could choose both FOX and CNN, bundling would 
be an even less effective entry deterrent. "erefore, if the model’s 
results show that bundling can, in some cases, facilitate FOX’s 
entry, this result is only made more robust by the fact that 
the model limits consumer choices in this way.
* After the fixed fees of entry have been paid, additional fixed fees do not present major 
hindrances for the MSOs, as monthly per-subscriber programming fees constitute their 
greatest expenses ( JRANK Encyclopedia).
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  !e model is based on the Whinston model, in which 
a  f i r s t  f i r m  (TW) operates as a monopoly in two markets 
(the market for premier movie channels and the twenty-four 
hour news market), and a second firm (FOX) plans to enter 
one of these markets (the twenty-four hour news market). !e 
timeline of the model is as follows:
1. Time Warner  chooses  whether or not to bundle HBO 
with CNN.
2. FOX chooses whether or not to launch FOX News.
3. Dependent on FOX’s entry decision, either TW or both 
firms set prices.
My analysis builds upon the Whinston model with two 
important adjustments that make it more applicable to the 
Time Warner-Turner case. First, I allow for heterogeneous pref-
erences among consumers for the goods in both markets. Second, 
I assume that in the twenty-four hour news market, all consum-
ers derive a constant additional utility, ∂, for purchasing FOX 
News instead of CNN. Marginal costs of production are zero 
for both firms. Consumers’ preferences, Ƚ, for HBO are uni-
formly distributed from zero to one. Consumers’ preferences, Ⱦǡ
for CNN are also uniformly distributed from zero to one. !us, 
consumers’ preferences for FOX News are uniformly distributed 
from Ɂ to 1+ Ɂ. If the price of the channel is set lower than a 
particular consumer’s valuation of it, that consumer will pur-
chase the channel, subject to the assumption that no consumer 
purchases both CNN and FOX News.
8MQI;EVRIVGLSSWIWnot to FYRHPe
FOX d o e s  n o t  e n t e r
By using backward induction, I can see what the optimal 
prices for each firm would vary according to TW’s bundling de-
cision and FOX’s entry decision. If TW chooses not to bundle 
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HBO and CNN and FOX chooses not to enter the twenty-four 
hour news market, then TW will set monopoly prices for both 
HBO and CNN because it faces no competition in either market. 
!us, TW’s profits in both markets as a function of price will be 
          p 1dp          ∫ 1
p
Quantity can be written directly as a function of price because 
          1dp          ∫ 1
p
captures the number of consumers whose valuation of the channel 
is higher than the price and who are therefore willing to purchase 
it. !e optimal price in each market is simple to obtain. !e first-
order condition is given by:







          p = 0.5.          
Consumer surplus in each market is the value that partici-
pating consumers derive from their purchase (v) minus the price 
that they pay. Consumer surplus over both markets is simply 
two times the consumer surplus in each, due to identical prices 
and preference probability distributions in each market:
          2 (v− 0.5)dv = 0.25          ∫ 1
0.5
FOX does enter
If TW chooses not to bundle and FOX decides to enter 
the twenty-four hour news market, TW still faces no competi-
tion in the premium movie channel market and thus continues 
to sell HBO at the monopoly price, 0.5. In the twenty-four 
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hour news market, TW and FOX engage in price competition. 
If FOX News and CNN were non-differentiated goods, they 
would compete according to Bertrand competition until prices 
reached zero, the marginal cost of each firm.* However, because 
consumers all prefer FOX News to CNN by Ɂ, the consumer 
with zero valuation for CNN would be indifferent between pay-
ing zero (the marginal cost) for CNN and paying Ɂ for FOX 
News. In FOX’s attempt to capture the market, the additional 
marginal utility gained from purchasing FOX News mirrors the 
effect that a lower marginal cost of production for FOX News 
would have. Instead of FOX and TW both lowering prices un-
til they reach zero, FOX can set its price P2B equal to Ɂ and 
capture the entire market. 
"e profit that FOX News makes for capturing the mar-
ket is:
          δ dβ = δ          ∫ 1
0
Consumer surplus is given by:
                    









By backwards reasoning, if Time Warner chooses not to bundle, 
FOX will enter the market only if Ɂ > F, in which case con-
sumer surplus will be 5/8. If Ɂ < F, FOX will not enter, and 
consumer surplus will be 0.25. Table 1 summarizes the results 
of the no-bundling case.
* Under Bertrand competition for two non-differentiated goods, firms set prices at the 
higher of the two marginal costs of production, and the firm with the lower marginal cost 
steals the market.
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FOX does n o t  e n t e r
If TW bundles and FOX does not enter the news market, 
TW will set its bundle price to maximize profits. To determine 
what that price will be, I find the probability distribution func-
tion of consumer preferences for the CNN-HBO bundle. !us, 
I carry out a convolution of the probability distribution func-
tions of consumer preferences for each individual good in the 
bundle. Since preferences Ƚ and Ⱦ are uniformly distributed from 
0 to 1, the distribution of the sum of these preferences will 
range from 0 to 2. !e optimal price for the bundle, PAB , is 
equal to √2/3. TW’s profits are ∏TW = 2/3√2/3. Consumer 
surplus is 1 − 8/9√2/3. !e calculations for these results can 
be found in Appendix A.
FOX does enter
If TW bundles and FOX enters the news market, TW 
sets its bundle price and FOX simultaneously sets the price 
of FOX News. To compete with FOX for consumers, the price 
TW sets for its bundle must be lower than the price it would 
set without competition. !us, 0 ≤ P AB ≤ 1. TW’s consum-
ers will consist of those who value the bundle more than PAB 
and who obtain greater surplus from purchasing the CNN-
HBO bundle than they do from purchasing FOX News alone. 
In other words, those who purchase the bundle will have prefer-
ences such that Ƚ + Ⱦ ≥ PAB and Ⱦ + Ƚ− PAB ≥ Ⱦ + Ɂ
− PB2 . !ose who purchase FOX News instead of the bundle 
have preferences such that Ⱦ≥ PB2 and Ⱦ+ Ƚ− PAB  ≤ Ⱦ+ Ɂ− PB2 . !e profit functions for TW and FOX are writ-
ten in Appendix B, where fz (z) is the probability distribution 
function for consumers’ valuations of the bundle (derived in 
Appendix A). Using the best reaction functions for both firms, 
each firm’s optimal prices can be found for different values of ɁǤ
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Furthermore, for each set of optimal prices, consumer surplus 
can be derived. !e functions for consumer surplus and each 
firm’s profits are derived in Appendix B.
If, for example, Ɂ = 0, four possible price sets satisfy the best 
response functions. However, only one of these price sets satisfies 
the necessary conditions for it to be an optimal price set for both 
profit-seeking firms. Because 0 ≤ PAB * ≤ 1 and because FOX 
would not set its price such that ∏F OX < 0, only one equilibri-
um price set remains, and it yields a profit for FOX of ؆0.0487 
and a consumer surplus of ؆  0.458. !is result is illustrated in 
Table 2 for the case when Ɂ = 0.
Using Microsoft Excel’s Solver add-in, I found optimal pric-
es, profits, and consumer surplus at different values of Ɂ and 
compiled this information into two graphs. !e graph in Ap-
pendix C compares FOX’s post-entry profits in the bundling 
and non- bundling cases. FOX will only choose to enter if Ɂ is 
high enough that expected profits under entry are greater than 
the fixed cost of entry. !us, the graph in Appendix C can be in-
terpreted as showing the maximum fixed cost, F, at which FOX 
would be willing to enter at different values of Ɂ. !e graph in 
Appendix D shows consumer surplus under each of the four 
bundling and entry combinations. Table 3 also summarizes the 
effect of Time Warner’s decision to bundle.
%REP]WMWSJXLI1SHIP
6IWYPXW
!e intent of the model analysis is two-fold. First, it is 
meant to discuss the circumstances under which bundling may 
facilitate, rather than deter, entry from FOX News. Second, 
it should explore how bundling can act as an effective price dis-
crimination tool.
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!e graph in Appendix C makes it clear that for values 
ofɁbelow 0.06, FOX would prefer Time Warner to bundle. For 
low levels of differentiation between FOX News and CNN, en-
try by FOX can occur at higher fixed entry costs under TW bun-
dling than it can without TW bundling. In the model, heteroge-
neous valuations mean that TW is not able to price the bundle 
so that every consumer prefers to purchase it over FOX News. 
AsɁgoes to zero, the extra amount consumers are willing to pay 
for FOX over CNN in the non-bundling case goes to zero, so 
FOX profits disappear. !us, allowing for heterogeneous prefer-
ences leads to the result that bundling facilitates entry at very 
low levels of  Ɂ. !is conclusion supports Whinston’s findings 
that bundling can facilitate entry when differentiation between 
the c o m m o n  g oods (in this case, the news channels) is small 
and preferences for the unique good (in this case, HBO) 
differ widely across consumers (Whinston 1990). Graphically, 
the y-intercept for the profit curves in the nonbundling case is 
zero: if CNN and FOX News are completely identical (i.e.,Ɂ = 
0), FOX’s entry will lead to Bertrand competition until prices 
are pushed down to the marginal cost of zero, at which point 
neither firm makes a profit. On the other hand, the y-intercept 
for the profit curve under bundling is greater than zero: even if 
CNN and FOX News are completely identical, some consumers 
will place such little value in HBO that they prefer to purchase 
FOX News alone rather than purchase the bundle. However, 
as Ɂ increases, FOX’s profit under nonbundling catches up to 
and quickly surpasses its profit under bundling. Prices under 
bundling grow more slowly in Ɂ, as shown in the best response 
functions (from Appendix B):
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=PAB
2 − δ− 3 + 4δ −PB2 P2B2 PB2 δ
2
1− 2 + δPB2
=P2B






While an increase in Ɂ has the direct effect of increasing 
P2B, it also has the direct effect of decreasing PAB. PAB has 
a positive relationship with P2B. "us, an increase in Ɂ has a 
direct, positive effect on P2B and an indirect, negative effect on 
P2B through PAB. While P2B still grows in Ɂ, these two effects 
counteract each other to some extent, so the price rises at a 
rate slower than Ɂ under bundling. Similarly, an increase in Ɂ 
means that consumers derive greater utility from purchasing 
FOX but also pay a higher price. "us, though FOX’s profit 
under bundling increases in Ɂ, it rises slower than the linear rate 
at which FOX’s profit grows in Ɂin the nonbundling case.
For Ɂ > 0.06, FOX News can enter at higher fixed costs 
under non-bundling than under bundling. However, this does 
not mean that bundling necessarily deters entry at these levels 
of Ɂ. Whether or not FOX will enter ultimately depends on 
the fixed cost, F, as well as the bundling decision.
'SRWYQIV7YVTPYW
With heterogeneous consumer preferences, bundling can 
also act as an effective price discrimination tool with important 
implications for consumer surplus. "e simplest way to see this 
effect is to compare consumer surplus without bundling to con-
sumer surplus with bundling if FOX chooses not to enter in 
either case. In the no bundling and no entry setting, TW sets 
monopoly prices, which leads to the lowest possible consumer 
surplus, as is apparent in the graph in Appendix D. In the bun-
dling and no entry setting, TW is able to maximize its profits 
at a bundle price that is lower than the sum of the monopoly 
prices for each good. Nalebuff calls this the “bundling discount” 
(2004). It is a consequence of the price discriminatory effect of 
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bundling, which allows TW to capture a greater percentage of 
both markets at a lower price. !is effect increases consumer 
surplus, as shown in the graph in Appendix D.
To see why this effect exists, consider a consumer who val-
ues HBO at Ƚ = 0.4999 and CNN at Ⱦ= 1. Recall that I am 
comparing the two simplest cases, in which FOX does not enter 
no matter what TW’s bundling decision is. If TW decides not 
to bundle, the consumer will purchase CNN at the monopoly 
price of 0.5 and receive a surplus of 0.5. If TW bundles, the 
consumer will purchase the bundle at the optimal bundle price 
of √2/3 and receive a surplus of approximately 0.68. In this 
case, bundling means that the consumer’s surplus rises and that 
HBO gains an additional subscriber.
Of course, the price discriminatory effect of bundling does 
not have positive implications for every consumer. Perhaps a dif-
ferent consumer would purchase CNN in the non-bundling case, 
but does not purchase anything if CNN is bundled with HBO 
(if for example, this consumer’s valuation of CNN is 0.5 ≤ Ⱦ
< √2/3 and valuation of HBO is Ƚ ≤ Ⱦ − √2/3). Yet, when 
TW faces no competition in either market, this “negative” effect 
of price discrimination on consumer surplus is not as powerful 
as the “positive” effect. A consumer willing to purchase either 
CNN or HBO independently in the non-bundling case is more 
likely to purchase them both in the bundle at the “bundling 
discount” than to purchase nothing at all. !is result is briefly 
explained in a more quantitative manner in Appendix E.
If FOX does choose to enter the market, consumer surplus 
increases no matter which bundling decision TW has made. 
Competition depresses prices and prevents TW from setting 
either monopoly prices in both markets or the monopoly bun-
dling price. In the case of entry and no bundling, consumer sur-
plus is constant, as TW sets the monopoly price on HBO, and 
FOX sets the price Ɂ on FOX News. As Ɂ increases, the price 
on FOX rises, but the value consumers derive from purchasing 
FOX rises equivalently, so consumer surplus is constant in Ɂ. 
In contrast, if TW chooses to bundle and FOX decides 
212 0IZMW4SWX1IVKIV&YRHPMRKMRXLI'EFPI-RHYWXV]
to enter, consumer surplus rises in Ɂ. As Ɂ grows larger, the 
bundle price offered by TW is suppressed by competition from 
the increasingly attractive FOX News network. Similarly, as Ɂ
increases, the price of FOX does not increase by the same 
amount because of the threat posed by competition with the 
bundle price (which has been further repressed by the increase 
in Ɂ). "us, as Ɂ rises, the consumers who purchase FOX receive 
higher levels of surplus caused by increased utility at a price 
that is held back by competition. Furthermore, when compared 
to FOX entry without TW bundling, entry with bundling al-
lows consumers to benefit from the bundling discount without 
suffering the same drawbacks of price discrimination. "ose 
consumers who would purchase CNN independently but pur-
chase nothing at all if it is bundled would enjoy an additional 
option: instead of an “all or nothing” choice under bundling, en-
try means that consumers may purchase FOX instead of the 
bundle.
A summary of the effect of bundling on FOX’s entry deci-
sion and consumer surplus is given in Table 4. If the differentia-
tion of FOX and CNN is at either extreme (either very high or 
very low), the bundling strategy that facilitates FOX’s entry is 
not the bundling strategy that maximizes consumer surplus if 
entry occurs. If, for example, CNN and FOX are nearly identical 
programs (e.g., Ɂ = 0.05), bundling facilitates FOX entry. Yet, 
if TW chooses not to bundle, consumer surplus is maximized 
only if FOX enters. If FOX does not enter, then consumer 
surplus without bundling is lower than consumer surplus with 
bundling because a no-bundling policy gets rid of the price dis-
criminatory effects. "is result reinforces earlier findings by O’Brien 
and Shaffer: “a policy of prohibiting bundled discounts may lead to 
… lower welfare if it fails to induce additional entry” (O’Brien and 
Shaffer 2005, 575). "e decision to bundle eliminates the risk of 
observing the lowest possible level of consumer surplus. From a 
comparison of both graphs, it is clear that for the extreme val-
ues of Ɂ, a trade-off exists between facilitating entry and maxi-
mizing surplus if entry occurs. "us, the FTC should take into 
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account that bundling may not necessarily deter entry, and 
that even in the cases where it makes entry more difficult, bun-
dling may still lead to higher consumer surplus. For the interme-
diate range of Ɂ, a trade-off exists between the benefits of the 
non-bundling policy, i.e., facilitating FOX entry and maximizing 
consumer surplus in the case of entry, and the benefit of the 
bundling policy, i.e., eliminating the risk of observing the low-
est possible level of consumer surplus if entry does not occur.
III. LIMITATIONS
In my presentation of the model, I discuss several sim-
plifications employed to make the model more mathematically 
viable. In this section, I point out additional assumptions made 
for the model that limit its realism and applicability. In order 
to compare the bundling of TW and CNN to the Whin-
ston model for bundling independent goods, the assumption 
that HBO and CNN are monopolies in their respective mar-
kets prior to FOX entry must hold. In the twenty-four hour 
news market, CNN indeed acted as a monopoly when FOX an-
nounced its intention to enter. However, just months prior to 
FOX’s final entry decision, MSNBC entered the twenty-four 
hour news market. In the premium movie channel market, 
HBO’s role as a monopoly can be debated on the grounds 
of market definition. While it served a particular niche of 
consumers in the early 1 9 90s, it is possible to redefine HBO’s 
market such that it has a few small competitors. An interest-
ing extension to the model would be to see how the effects of 
bundling change if CNN and HBO operate in oligopolies with 
differentiated goods. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this pa-
per, modeling TW as an oligopoly would only strengthen my 
hypothesis that bundling does not always deter FOX entry. 
Without full market power, TW’s decision to bundle would 
act as an even less potent entry deterrent than is found in the 
model. #us, the assumption that TW operates as a monopoly 
in both markets indicates a more conservative approach to the 
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model. !e assumptions made for consumer preferences in the 
model are more troublesome. Clearly, consumer preferences for 
HBO and CNN are unlikely to be uniformly distributed. Yet, 
the assumption that preferences are uniformly distributed and 
calibrated from zero to one is mathematically clean and provides 
a nice structure for analysis. Similarly, the assumption that every 
consumer prefers FOX to CNN by a constant value works as 
a way of simplifying the model to provide clear intuition but 
does not hold true in reality. Certain regions within the U.S. 
may prefer FOX to CNN for sociopolitical reasons, but it is 
not likely that every consumer would prefer FOX to CNN. It 
is even less believable that each would prefer FOX to CNN by 
the same amount. However, because marginal costs are zero (an 
accurate assumption for the extra cost CTPSPs incur in order 
to provide programming to one additional region), the model 
must include some type of differentiation between FOX and 
CNN in order for the effect of Whinston’s results to be as-
sessed and developed. Otherwise, FOX would never enter in the 
non-bundling case. !us, the simplest form of differentiation, in 
which FOX is always preferred by a constant amount to CNN, 
is used. While it would be more realistic to incorporate prefer-
ences between differentiated goods according to the Hotelling 
model, a Hotelling model of preferences for differentiated news 
programs would be much more complex when combined with 
heterogeneous valuations for HBO under bundling.
Another aspect of consumer surplus that our model 
does not discuss is content variety. Consider a consumer who 
is indifferent between purchasing the CNN-HBO bundle and 
purchasing FOX News alone (at a certain level of Ɂ) . A more 
accurate model may describe consumers as deriving an addi-
tional utility from purchasing the bundle rather than purchas-
ing FOX alone because the bundle provides the subscriber with 
more content variety. However, if the model allowed consumers 
to purchase both FOX News and the bundle, the extra utility 
derived from content variety would be highest if the consumer 
purchased content from both FOX and TW. Thus, ignoring the 
215Journal of Politics & Society
content variety of utility has ambiguous implications for the 
entry-deterrent effect of bundling. Perhaps modeling an extra 
utility from content variety would make bundles more attrac-
tive to consumers, but it would also imply  that  some con-
sumers want to purchase from both FOX and TW, which my 
model does not allow. Nonetheless, if a consumer does not value 
an additional channel enough to purchase it without the con-
tent variety utility, it seems unlikely that the consumer would 
purchase it in order to receive the additional utility of having 
an extra channel. "e relationship between content variety and 
consumer surplus is central to the current debate over à la 
carte channel pricing.*
IV. CONCLUSION
"ough many of the model’s assumptions limit its use, it 
provides insight into the FTC’s decision to forbid Time Warner 
from bundling CNN and HBO. In particular, the model reveals 
that bundling can facilitate entry when differentiation between 
the tied goods (those in the market that faces entry) is very low. 
Of course, it is unlikely that FOX News and CNN would be 
nearly identical programs, as news programs could be differenti-
ated by a focus on international or local news or by an align-
ment with conservative or liberal politics. The implication 
of the model is that bundling becomes more helpful for entry 
as FOX News and CNN become less differentiated. Further-
more, the model reveals a trade-off between facilitating entry 
and maximizing consumer surplus. Under the fixed cost and Ɂ
values at which bundling makes entry more difficult, bundling 
may also maximize consumer surplus if entry occurs. If entry 
by FOX is deterred independently of TW’s actions, bundling 
also maximizes consumer surplus. "us, if the entry costs faced 
by FOX appear too high to overcome no matter which bun-
* For example, the Besen case study groups HBO together with Showtime and other movie 
channels in a premium network market, though none of HBO’s competitors in this 
market have nearly as large a subscription base as HBO (Besen et al., 1999).
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dling decision TW makes, the decision to bundle leads to price 
discriminatory effects that ultimately benefit consumers. It is 
important to note that advertising benefits, lower marketing 
costs, and lower administrative fees usually accompany a decision 
to bundle (Crawford 2005, 42), which is another incentive for 
bundling not discussed in the model.
"ese results imply that while the FTC’s decision to for-
bid Time Warner from bundling CNN and HBO may be prima 
facie pro-competitive, a policy that forbids bundling may not 
be the best thing for consumers. Levels of entry costs and dif-
ferentiation between FOX News and CNN must be assessed 
alongside TW’s bundling decision to evaluate both the like-
lihood of entry and the consequences entry has for consumer 
surplus. If the FTC fears that bundling HBO with CNN would 
deter FOX’s entry, then, by virtue of the fact that the FTC’s 
regulations are meant primarily to protect consumers, this fear 
should be rooted in the belief that entry increases consumer 
surplus. Yet, both the price discriminatory effect of bundling and 
the fact that bundling may facilitate entry under certain condi-
tions must be taken into account when considering the effect 
of bundling on consumer surplus.
    Shortly after the FTC’s decision to forbid the newly 
merged Time Warner-Turner enterprise from bundling, Time 
Warner’s CNN faced another important turn of events. On Oc-
tober 7, 1996, just weeks after the consent agreement for 
the Time Warner-Turner merger was publicized, FOX News 
launched (Besen et al. 1999). It is unclear how foreknowledge 
that TW would not be allowed to bundle CNN with HBO 
factored into FOX’s decision to launch FOX News. The effec-
tiveness of the consent agreement must be viewed in light of the 
fact that another CTPSP, the National Broadcasting Compa-
ny, launched its own twenty-four hour news program (MSNBC) 
in the summer of 1996. When the consent agreement was fi-
nalized, Time Warner no longer had monopoly power in the 
twenty-four hour news market because MSNBC had already 
entered. "us, CNN-HBO bundling would not have discour-
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aged FOX entry as much as it would have if MSNBC had 
not already entered the market. Even ignoring the effect of MS-
NBC’s entrance on FOX’s decision to enter the market, it is far 
from certain that forbidding bundling will always aid the consumer. 
Although the model itself cannot be used to accurately predict dif-
ferences in consumer surplus, it has shown that bundling has the 
potential to increase consumer surplus. "us, insofar as the FTC 
regulates the cable industry to protect consumer’s interests, these 
results cast doubt on the merit of the FTC’s interference in TW’s 
bundling decision.*
*As a final thought, FOX’s reaction to another stipulation set forth by the consent 
agreement adds an interesting layer to the case. In addition to barring TW from bundling 
CNN with HBO, the consent agreement decreed that TW would be forced to offer one 
other, independently produced twenty-four hour news network to its subscribers by 2001 
(FTC v. Time Warner et al., Consent Agreement, 1997). When TW chose to carry MSNBC, 
FOX sued, stating that it would not be able to survive if it did not receive carriage from 
TW MSOs in particular regions of the United States (especially the densely populated 
and lucrative region of New York City). Although TW successfully blocked the suit from 
going to court, both companies decided to settle. After acce p t i ng  wh at  w a s  re p o r te d 
to  b e  a  ve r y  profitable deal from FOX, Time Warner began to offer FOX News to its 
subscribers.  Rennhoff and Serfes provide a good summary of the literature on bundling 
in oligopolistic markets, where bundling policies tend to lower firms’ profits (Renhoff and 
Serfes 2008, 551). However, Stole finds that bundling in an oligopoly setting may still 
capture price discriminatory effects that make it profitable and may lead to foreclosure 
of entrants (Stole 2003).
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Appendix A: Bundling Without Entry
Calculations for finding the probability distribution of con-
sumer preferences for the bundle and thereby finding the optimal 
bundle price:
          (x) = (x) = { },           fα fβ 1 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,0 otherwise
where x is a particular value of Ƚ or Ⱦ. 
 




where y is a particular value of Ⱦ and z is a particular value of Ƚ + Ⱦ. 
fz(z) is zero unless 0 ≤ z – y ≤ 1, in which case it is one. 
Since 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, if z < 0 or z > 2, fz(z) =  0.
If 0 ≤ z ≤ 1,
          (z− y) = { },           fα 1 where y ≤ z0 otherwise
thus,
          (z) = dy = z          fZ ∫
2
0
If 1 ≤ z ≤ 2,
          (z− y) = { },           fα 1 where z− 1 ≤ y ≤ 10 otherwise
thus,
          (z) = dy = 2− z          fZ ∫
1
z−1
          (z) = { } and 0 otherwise          fZ z,2− z,
if 0 ≤ z ≤ 1
if 1 < z ≤ 2
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Time Warner will set the price of its bundle to maximize 
profits:




 If PAB < 1,
















                    










If PAB > 1,






[2− 2 + ]PAB PAB 12 P2AB
In this case, 
                    










P*AB = √2/3 maximizes profits and is therefore the optimal bun-
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dling price. 
Consumer surplus in this case would be:
                    











= 1− 8/9 2/3
−−−√
Appendix B: Bundling with Entry





















By differentiating the above functions with respect to 
PAB and PB2, respectively, and setting the resulting functions 
equal to zero, the following best response functions are found: 
                    
=PAB
2 − δ− 2 + 4δ −PB2 P2B2 PB2 δ
2
1− 2 + δPB2
=PB2






Consumer surplus is the sum of the surplus of consumers who 
purchase the bundle and the surplus of consumers who purchase 
FOX News alone:
                    
(z− ) (z)dzdα + (β + δ− )dβdα∫ 1
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Appendix E
!e price discriminatory effect of bundling does not have 
positive implications for every consumer. Consider a consumer 
who would purchase CNN in the non-bundling case, but does not 
purchase anything if CNN is bundled with HBO. !is consumer's 
valuation of CNN is 0.5 ≤ Ⱦ <√2/3 and valuation of HBO is Ƚ 
≤ Ⱦ – √2/3.
Although bundling lowers this particular consumer's surplus, 
the overall price discriminatory effect of bundling is an increase in 
total consumer surplus. When TW does not face any competition, 
a consumer is only hurt by bundling if this consumer's preferences 
are such that purchasing one independent good at the monopoly 
price is valued more than purchasing nothing, which is in turn val-
ued more than purchasing the bundle. Mathematically this con-
sumer's preferences would only satisfy: 
which is approximated by
Analogously, the consumer's preferences would only satisfy:
which is approximated by
In contrast, a consumer would have preferences
when 
(with the analogue for Ƚ). Due to the uniform distribution of pref-
erences, 1 > Ⱦ ဍ0.3 occurs more frequently than 0.3 > Ⱦ ဍ 0, and 
1 > Ƚ ဍ 0.3 occurs more frequently than 0.3 ဍ Ƚ > 0. !us, a con-
sumer willing to purchase either CNN or HBO independently in 
the non-bundling case us more likely to purchase them both in the 
bundle at the “bundling discount” then to purchase nothing at all.
                    
α− > 0 > α+ β− ,PMHBO PAB
− > β,  or, 0.5− > βPAB PMHBO 2/3
−−−√
          0.3 ⪆ β > 0          
                    
β− > 0 > α+ β−PM1B PAB
0.5− > α2/3
−−−√
          0.3 ⪆ α > 0          
                    
α+ β− > α−PAB PM1A
1 > β ⪆ 0.3
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